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Abstract
In this thesis, we present a novel socio-physical human orchestration framework to
deal with the increasing complexity of smart city environments, by capitalizing on
recent advances in game theory and reinforcement learning, with the goal of solving
the efficient management of a smart city while improving the quality of life for the
humans living in said smart city. This problem has become more challenging as the
smart cities have become more complicated and complex with new technologies. In
the proposed framework, each human selects a Point of Interest (PoI) that it wants to
visit. This selection is performed by acting as stochastic learning automaton, which
evaluates the socio-physical conditions of the environment while learning from its
previous experiences. As a result, those humans that have selected a specific PoI to
visit, ”compete” with each other in order to finally perform their visit. The humans’
behavior is studied as a non-cooperative game among them, through adopting the
theory of minority games. The resulting Nash equilibrium point classifies which of
the humans that finally visit each PoI. A low complexity reinforcement learning based
algorithm is used achieve the overall framework. Finally, a detailed set of numerical
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and comparative results are shown to provide information on the efficiency of the
approach.
This work has been published in:
N. Patrizi, P.A. Apostolopoulos, K. Rael, and E.E. Tsiropoulou, ”Sociophysical Human Orchestration in Smart Cities,” in IEEE International
Conference on Smart Computing (SMARTCOMP), pp. 115-120, 2019
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Chapter 1
Overview

1.1

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth of smart cities which, among other
benefits, provide smart service systems to enrich and support people’s lives and entertainment options [1]. People can join different social events (e.g., dining out,
playing sports) by visiting different Points of Interest (PoIs), e.g., restaurants, stadiums, tax offices, in their daily life and decide which places to go to according to some
social and physical parameters (e.g., location preferences, geographical proximity).
The efficient orchestration of humans within a smart city can result in many fold
benefits and catalyze the sustained economic growth of the smart city. However, the
tremendous increase in available information for decision-making, the large number
of possible PoIs within a smart city along with specific social and physical characteristics and constraints, makes the problem of selecting the most interesting PoI and
deciding whether to visit it, extremely challenging.

1

Chapter 1. Overview

1.2
1.2.1

Background & Motivation
Game Theory & Reinforcement Learning in CyberPhysical Soscial Systems

Smart cities act as cyber-physical social systems consisting of components related to
control, communications, and computing [2, 3]. Several recent research works in the
field of cyber-physical social systems exploit and study the Quality of Experience
of the end-users in dynamically changing environments, such as art places [4, 5,
6], mobile communications systems [7, 8], electronic communication services and
applications [9], museums [10, 11, 12, 13], public safety events in smart cities [14,
15, 16, 17], man-made disaster management scenarios [18, 19, 20, 21], and others.
The aforementioned research works adopt distributed solutions and methods, such
as game theory [22] and reinforcement learning [23, 24], in order to address the
corresponding problem of optimizing the end-users Quality of Experience given the
nature of the cyber-physical social systems, where lack of information is observed
among the involved entities in the system.
Game theory is a powerful tool in order to capture the preferences and the corresponding decisions of end-users with opposite and competitive interests within a
dynamically changing environment [25]. Game Theory has been applied in several
fields and applications of the cyber-physical social systems, focusing on the control, communications, and computing aspects of them, such as the unmanned aerial
vehicles-based communications [26, 27] and computing applications [28, 29] to enable the efficient coordination of the different types of entities, sensors, humans, etc.,
residing within the smart city’s environment.
Reinforcement learning is a category of machine learning focusing on how the
autonomous agents take actions in an environment in order to maximize the notion
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of a cumulative reward. Reinforcement learning is one of three basic machine learning
paradigms, alongside supervised learning and unsupervised learning [30]. Focusing
on the field of cyber-physical social systems, reinforcement learning techniques have
been applied in smart grid systems to enable the autonomous decision making of the
end-users regarding their electricity consumption, the choice of the utility company
to be served from [31, 32], as well as the pricing policy making [33], in dynamic
wireless environments in order to enable the end-users to select the provider to be
served from [34, 35, 36], in smart museums to enable the time and cost efficient
visitors’ touring [37, 38], just to name some indicative applications.
Based on the above discussion, it is envisioned that the tools of game theory and
reinforcement learning are becoming part of the artificial intelligence era in order
to enable the smart and distributed decision making within complex environments
[39, 40]. Indeed, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as a powerful tool to support devices’ autonomous human-like decision-making, while being founded on and
supported by multi-disciplinary techniques, such as machine learning, control theory,
game theory, optimization theory, and meta-heuristics [41, 42].

1.2.2

Smart City Planning & Points of Interests Visits

Recently, a number of research works have been proposed in the context of planning
PoI visits, mainly exploiting the information extracted from the event-based social
networks (EBSN) such as Foursquare [43], Meetup [44], and Twitter [45, 46, 47]. In
[48], the authors analyze the humans’ behavior in EBSNs by exploiting their social
activities and interactions towards explaining their attendance in PoIs and identifying
the most influential factors on the humans’ decisions. This study has been extended
in [49], where the authors provide a similar analysis, regarding groups of humans who
belong to common social groups, by utilizing a Mixed Markov Model to identify the
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Figure 1.1: Smart City Illustration and Sensitive Services (Source: Internet of Business)

groups’ behavioral patterns. In [50], the authors introduce various recommendation
algorithms of PoIs to be visited by the humans based on their past visited PoIs, the
physical location of the available PoIs, the social interaction among the humans and
their similarity among each other. A traveling recommender system is proposed in
[51], by jointly considering the PoIs popularity, the similarity of the humans that
visit the same PoI, and the similarity of the available PoIs towards recommending
PoIs.
Furthermore, in [52], the authors study the problem of real-time PoI and event
recommendations to the humans by introducing the event-participant arrangement
strategy. Following this concept, the humans’ satisfaction scores, regarding an arrangement of visiting a PoI, are updated in real-time and the humans can accept
or reject the proposed arrangement. A human-centric approach is also followed in
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[53], where the humans are assigned to PoIs and events aiming at maximizing the
humans’ perceived satisfaction. On the other hand, a system-centric approach is proposed in [54] to support the PoIs’ management towards maximizing their perceived
”satisfaction”, which is expressed in terms of revenue and publicity. A more holistic
approach is introduced in [55] by exploiting the whole set of EBSNs functionalities
to recommend PoIs to humans, social groups to humans, and tags to groups.
As it becomes apparent from the above discussion, several studies have constructed models of recommending PoIs to humans, either by following a humancentric or a system-centric approach. Furthermore, the literature is already mature
enough in exploiting the information available in EBSNs, such as humans’ interests
in PoIs, humans’ social interactions, geographical proximity to the PoIs, etc. However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior work has dealt with the problem of
socio-physical autonomous human orchestration in a smart city environment, where
humans can exploit their personal social and physical characteristics, as well as those
of the PoIs to make efficient distributed and autonomous decisions that improve their
personal reward from the visited PoIs.

1.3

Smart City Networks Applications,
Challenges, and Future Problems

1.3.1

Applications in smart cities

The first application considered is the EBSNs previously mentioned. These newer
social networks have similar functionality to that of traditional social networks, but
with the added aspect of allowing the user to communicate their location and attendance to an event to other users. This broadcasting of user’s location and status
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allows for some new opportunities to facilitate a better experience when using an
EBSN. Most notably, businesses and public spaces (parks, national monuments, museums, etc.) can use this data to learn more about where people like to spend time
and get a better idea for what events individuals are actively participating in towards
improving the designed recommender systems and improving the end users’ perceived
Quality of Experience [56, 57, 58]. This allows for those businesses to adapt to what
people like or offer them an incentive to get them to visit their business [59, 60].
Another application space is in crowd sourcing real time geography based information. These applications are based around the users providing their own specific
information to the service provider, which then uses the information to improve their
own services. A prominent example is the traffic data that apple and google maps
provide. This information is provided to google and apple from the users, which is
then used to construct the traffic information that is presented to the users in the
application. The users are compensated for this information by being able to use the
feature.

1.3.2

Challenges in Smart cities

Clearly, these new systems will have a number of associated challenges. These would
range from a pure performance standpoint to facilitating individuals choosing to
adopt these new system into their everyday life. We first analyze some of the potential problems that these systems face from a pure networking point of view. The
networking of these systems
Some users will have an inherent resistance to changing how they interact to
include these newer solutions into their lives. This could be due to concerns about
privacy or just being unwilling to change. With the work going into developing
and providing these options to the public, it is important that they choose to adopt
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them. This leads to the problems of incentive providing. One solution of which
was presented above in Section 1.3.1 with the example of crowd-sourcing navigation
data. This approach works well as users have an inherent desire to participate in
that system as it could reduces travel times and avoid potentially congested areas.
This approach would work well in such cases were the service provided inherently
relies on the information provided from each user to create an accurate model, as
a more accurate model will provide a better result for all the users to benefit from.
However, this wouldn’t necessarily apply if the user doesn’t naturally gain from the
improvement of the model. Consider a case where a business would like to know
more information about the needs of the humans in the community. These humans
may be resistant to providing this information due to any number of concerns. To
overcome this, the business should incentive the humans to provide the information
such that the humans become willing to do so.

1.3.3

Future problems in smart cities

As networks become more and more complex, it will continue to be important to
improve upon the fundamental infrastructure that these communication systems operate on. With the internet of things’ impact on smart cities as a whole, it will naturally share many of the same fundamental problems. Aspects such as interference
management and efficient power consumption will become increasingly important
in this field as the number of devices will continue to increase which will need to
communicate effectively.
Efficient management of the smart city is another fundamental problem. Clearly,
as more information becomes available from all of the various systems in smart cities,
smart cities should use that information to coordinate various services and provide
a better experience for all citizens that live in the smart city.
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The last open problem is the need to have some dynamicity in a smart city
network. A truly smart city would be able to know about potential future events
that could impact the performance of the system and adapt to perform better with
this knowledge. This type of adaptation is becoming more important as further
improvements in network performance continue.

1.4

Contributions

This thesis aims exactly at filling the aforementioned research gap and proposes a
holistic human-centric distributed approach realizing (i) the PoI selection by the humans, via a reinforcement learning technique, and (ii) the human’s decision-making
process of visiting a PoI, by exploiting the theory of minority games. Our proposed
framework consists of two layers to treat the socio-physical autonomous human orchestration in a smart city. At the first layer, the humans are considered as stochastic
learning automata who learn from their past choices of PoIs and the reaction of the
smart city environment towards selecting a PoI that will improve their experienced
reward. The humans make probabilistic choices of PoIs until they reach a firm PoI
selection by exploiting their social characteristics, e.g., interest to visit a PoI, social
interaction among the humans that visit the same PoI, and the physical characteristics, e.g., cost of visit, physical proximity to the PoI, experienced Quality of Service
(QoS) from visiting the PoI, PoI’s capacity and availability.
Given the convergence of the humans’ PoI selection, the humans that selected the
same PoI and expressed their initial interest to visit it, ”compete” with each other
towards finally visiting the PoI and improving their experienced reward from their
visit. The latter humans’ behavior and interaction is modeled as a non-cooperative
game among the humans that selected the same PoI towards determining their final
attendance or not. Towards showing the existence of the game’s Nash equilibrium,
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which identifies the specific humans who will visit the PoI, the theory of minority
games is adopted. A distributed and low-complexity algorithm is introduced, which
determines both the humans’ PoI selection and the humans who visit the PoIs.
Detailed numerical and comparative results demonstrate that the proposed holistic
framework concludes to a promising solution for realizing the autonomous human
orchestration in a smart city, that conforms with the needs and requirements of both
the humans and the smart city planning and management.

1.5

Outline

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, the overall system
model is described. While in Section 2.2 the proposed human-centric reinforcement
learning-based PoI selection process is presented in detail. Section 2.3 introduces
the autonomous human orchestration to the PoIs based on the theory of minority
games, additionally in Section 2.4 the Smart Orchestration in Points of Interest
(SmartPoI) algorithm is presented. Finally, a detailed numerical evaluation of our
approach via modeling and simulation is presented in Chapter 3. Specifically, the
pure performance is evaluated in Section 3.2 and comparative results are presented
in Section 3.3. Finally, Chapter 4 provides the conclusion to this thesis.

9

Chapter 2
Human Orchestration in Smart
cities

2.1

System Model

In this thesis, a smart city environment is considered, with humans interested in
visiting various PoIs inside of a smart city. These humans will decide which PoI they
are interested in visiting by taking into account the socio-physical characteristics of
each PoI and the overall system. Once they have a choice on which PoI they are
interested in visiting they each play a minority game to determine which humans
will actually visit the PoI. The humans of the system are dentoted as |N |, with
the humans residing in the smart cities boundaries, with the set denoted as N =
{1, ..., n, ..., |N |}. These humans select from the various PoIs |S| (e.g., restaurants,
theaters, tax offices, police station, etc), with the corresponding set of PoIs being
denoted as S = {1, ..., s, ..., |S|}. Each human will make selection to as to which PoI
they have a desire to visit based on their own personal social characteristics, as well
as the physical conditions that are available in the smart city environment, as shown
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?

?

?

Figure 2.1: Humans autonomous decision making regrading the Point of Interest
that they will visit.

in Figure 2.1.
The physical and social parameters considered in the system are designed to
provide a holistic view of what aspects matter and the importance thereof to each
human, with each human having personalized preferences. The first parameter considered is the interest of the human to visiting a specific PoI. For example, a human
might need to pickup groceries in order to make dinner and would thus have a high
interest in visiting a grocery store. Specifically, each human n, n ∈ N has a personal
interest in,s to visit a PoI s, s ∈ S.The interest degree in,s ranges from zero to one,
i.e, in,s ∈ [0, 1], with smaller values representing less interest to visit the PoI and
larger values meaning a greater interest to visit that PoI. This shows and considers
the unique preference of a human to a space based on their own personal view of
the space. Next, as many places that humans visit are based off of a social element
(e.g. restaurant, movie theater, etc.), the social aspect of a PoI should be considered. Naturally, this social aspect is based upon personal preferences of one human’s
view towards other humans in the space. For instance, a human’s social interest for
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visiting a PoI with humans that they enjoy interacting with will have a higher social
interest value compared to that of a PoI with humans they don’t like interacting with
or a PoI with no humans in it. Thus, the peers’ influence on visiting a PoI is captured
by the social interest SIn,j which expresses the level of willingness of humans n, j to
socially interact with each other. We set the range of SIn,j as SIn,j ∈ [0, 1] and we
assume that the level of social interaction among two humans n, j ∈ N is directly
proportional to the value of SIn,j .
The humans and the PoIs in a smart city are characterized by some physical
conditions and parameters. Each PoI s has an associated cost cs to serve the needs
of the humans. For example, there are restaurants that are more expensive compared
to others which has a drastic influence on a humans’ decisions to visit them. The PoI’s
cost cs of serving a human is normalized with respect to the maximum cost of a PoI
in the smart city, i.e., cs ∈ [0, 1], with values of cs closer to 1 being more expensive.
Naturally, each PoI has a limited amount of humans that can be accommodated at
any time, thus every PoI is characterized by a physical capacity Nsthres , s ∈ S of
humans that it represents the amount of people that can be served. For example,
restaurants will have a limited number of seats and other PoIs will have a limited
based off of fire safety laws as well. Furthermore, humans will tend to not want
to travel long distances to visit a PoI, consequently the distance dn,s of human n
from the PoI s also plays a role in the human’s personal physical factor that weighs
on their corresponding decision with regard to which PoI they would like to visit.
In our analysis, the distance dn,s is also normalized with respect to the maximum,
thus, dn,s ∈ [0, 1] with values close to zero meaning that the human is close to
that respective PoI. Additionally, humans will prefer PoIs where they are efficiently
and effectively served. PoIs with more people in them are congested and will cause
humans to have a probability of not being served effectively. This shows that the
number of humans |N |Go
s , who decide to visit a PoI s is a critical factor in the humans’
decision to go to a PoI. This leads to the defined experienced Quality of Service (QoS)
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of human n by visiting a PoI s which is denoted by QoSn,s , with QoSn,s ∈ [0, 1]. The
P
[k]
overall Quality of Service is directly proportional to the value of tk=0 QoSn,s , which
expresses the human’s cumulative experienced QoS over the time including all the
PoIs that the human has visited. If the humans that go to a PoI are more than the
PoI’s capacity, then their experienced QoS is zero (as no human would be served
thres
effectively), i.e., QoSn,s = 0, if |N |Go
, while if the number of humans that
s > Ns

visit the PoI is less than the capacity of the PoI, the normalized human’s QoS is
given by QoSn,s = 1 −

2.2

|N |Go
s
,
Nsthres

thres
.
if |N |Go
s ≤ Ns

Socio-physical Point of Interest selection

In this section, our goal is to devise a distributed and autonomous mechanism to
enable the humans to select which PoIs they are potentially interested in visiting
based on the socio-physical characteristics previously mentioned. To accomplish
this, we utilize a reinforcement learning technique, which allows for the humans to
learn from their prior choices and the effect that it produced on the overall smart city.
The humans are considered as stochastic learning automata [31] and at each time
slot t of the reinforcement learning loop, they select to visit a PoI from their available
set of actions an (t) = {a1 , ..., as , ..., a|S| }, which represents the available PoIs within
the smart city. The physical meaning of the time slot t can be defined based on the
specific smart city application. Towards selecting a PoI, the humans consider their
social and physical characteristics (Section 2.1): (i) Nsthres : the maximum number of
humans that the PoI s can accommodate, (ii) cs : the normalized cost associated with
visiting and being served at the PoI s, (iii) dn,s : the normalized physical distance of
[t]

human n from PoI s, (iv) in,s : the normalized interest of human n to visit the PoI
Go[t]

s at time slot t, (v) |N |s

: the number of humans that have selected to go to the
P |Go[t]
[t]
s
PoI s at the time slot t, (vi) |N
SIn,j : the total social interest and interaction
j=1
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I really
want to go
there!

I don’t like
that place.

500 ft
5 mi.

Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of the reward function.

Go[t]

of human n with all the other humans |N |s
that have selected to go to the PoI
Pt
[k]
s at time slot t, and (vii) k=0 QoSn,s : the cumulative QoS that the human n has
experienced until the time slot t including all the PoIs that the human has visited.
By combining the above humans’ social characteristics and PoIs’ physical parameters, we define the reward function that a human n experiences by visiting a PoI s,
as follows.
[t]

[t+1]
rn,s

=

Nsthres · in,s ·

P|N |Go[t]
s

j=1
Go[t]
|N |s

[t]

SIn,j ·

[k]
k=0 QoSn,s

Pt

(2.1)

· cs · dn,s

[t+1]

The reward function rn,s is dynamically determined by the human’s past exP
[k]
perience (e.g., tk=0 QoSn,s ), as well as by the reaction of the smart city environment, meaning the choices of the rest of the humans residing in the smart city.
[t]

Also, the reward function rn,s of each human n per available PoI s is normalized as
[t+1]

r̃n,s

[t+1]

=

rn,s
P

[t+1]

s∈S rn,s

[t+1]

[t+1]

to represent the reward probability r̃n,s , 0 ≤ r̃n,s
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b
b

Convergence Time

Reward

Convergence Time

Reward

Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of the dependence of the convergence time and
the corresponding achieved reward from the learning rate b.

[t+1]

human n per each PoI s. In a nutshell, the reward probability r̃n,s

reflects the

potential satisfaction that the human n may experience by visiting the PoI s at time
slot t. A graphical representation of the reward function and its individual components is presented in Figure 2.2. The humans consider their reward probabilities in
order to determine and update their action probabilities of selecting a PoI.
Each human acts as a stochastic learning automaton and updates its action prob[t]

[t]

[t]

[t]

[t]

ability vector Prn = [P rn,1 , ..., P rn,s , ..., P rn,S ], where P rn,s represents the probability that the human n will select the PoI s at time slot t. Based on the theory
of the stochastic learning automata [31, 61, 62], the humans update their action
probabilities based on the following rule [63].
[t]
[t]
[t+1]
[t]
+ b · r̃n,s
· (1 − P rn,s
), sn[t] = sn[t+1]
P rn,s
= P rn,s

(2.2a)

[t+1]
[t]
[t]
[t]
P rn,s
= P rn,s
− b · r̃n,s
· P rn,s
, sn[t] 6= sn[t+1]

(2.2b)

where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 represents the humans’ learning rate in terms of exploiting the smart
city environment. The dependence of the convergence time and the corresponding
achieved reward from the learning rate b is presented in Figure 2.3. The human’s
probability to select the same PoI in the next time slot t + 1 is updated following
Eq. 2.2a, while the human’s probability to select a different PoI in the next time
slot t + 1 is calculated by Eq. 2.2b. Also, it is noted that the humans have initially
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no prior knowledge regarding their action probabilities, thus the initial selection
[t=0]

of a PoI by the humans is made with equal probability, i.e., P rn,s

=

1
, ∀s
|S|

∈

S. The algorithmic description of the socio-physical PoI selection based on the
proposed reinforcement learning technique and the convergence of the humans’ action
probabilities are studied in Section 2.4.

2.3

Autonomous Human Orchestration based on
Minority Games

After the socio-physical PoI selection by the humans, a number of humans |N |s has
selected to potentially visit the PoI s at the next time slot, where Ns = {1, ..., |N |s }
denotes their corresponding set. The humans ”compete” with each other towards
finally visiting the PoI that they have initially selected. The interactions and behavior
of the humans, who through the reinforcement learning framework expressed interest
in visiting the same PoI, is further captured via a non-cooperative game among
them. Specifically, the theory of minority games is adopted, which proposes that a
number of players (i.e., humans) repeatedly compete with each other to be in the
minority group via making an action of the two available ones, i.e., go or not to the
initially selected PoI. At each iteration ite of the game, the humans that belong to
the minority group perceive increased satisfaction and they promote their winning
strategy for the next iteration of the game. The main benefit of the minority games
is that they have a non-empty set of Pure Nash equilibria (PNE) [31].
Let us denote the minority game as GM G = [Ns , {An }, {fan (n)}], where Ns is
the set of humans that have selected to visit the PoI s following the reinforcement
learning framework (Section 2.2). At each iteration ite of the minority game, each
ite
human can decide to visit the PoI (aite
n = 1) or not (an = 0). The set of human’s
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ite
strategies is denoted as An = {0, 1}, aite
n ∈ An . For each strategy an ∈ An , there is

: {1, ..., n, ..., |N |} → R, which represents the reward that the
a payoff function faite
n
human n experiences by making the action an at the iteration ite of the minority
game. The payoff function faite
is formulated as follows.
n

=
faite
n



1, if |N |an ≤ N thres
s
s

(2.3)


0, otherwise
where if the number of humans that select a strategy an (i.e., |N |as n ) is less than the
physical capacity Nsthres of the PoI s then they promote their action, i.e., faite
= 1.
n
To solve the minority game and determine its Pure Nash equilibrium, a distributed
learning algorithm is required. This goal can be achieved by multiple distributed
learning techniques, e.g., Q-learning, exponential learning, trial and error learning.
In this thesis, we have adopted an exponential learning technique to determine in
an autonomous and distributed manner the Pure Nash equilibrium of the minority
game GM G (see Section 2.4).

2.4

Smart Orchestration in Points of Interest
(SmartPoI) Algorithm

In this section, the distributed Smart Orchestration in PoIs (SmartPoI) algorithm is
presented. At each time slot t, each human n acts as a stochastic learning automaton
making its choice of the PoI that wants to visit, based on its action probabilities
[t]

[t]

[t]

Prn = [P rn,1 , . . . , P rn,|S| ]. After each human’s choice, a cluster of humans |N |s , ∀s ∈
S is constructed, and a minority game is played to determine the set of humans who
finally visit the PoI (NsGO ), and the corresponding set of humans who do not visit the
PoI (NsN GO ). For the minority game played for each PoI s, a distributed exponential
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learning algorithm is adopted, which leads the humans to make smart choices by


Ns
Ns
+ N thres
considering only their past actions and converge to one of the N thres
+1
−1
s

s

PNE points [64]. For each cluster of humans |N |s that selected the PoI s, each
0
human n by starting with equal probabilities of going and not going, i.e., prn,a
=
n =0
0
0
0
= 0, at each iteration ite of
= πn,a
= 0.5, and zero scores, i.e., πn,a
prn,a
n =0
n =0
n =1

the minority game the human n determines its action aite
n and regarding its payoff
ite
.
(Eq. 2.3) and the winning action wite , it updates its chosen action’s score πn,a
faite
n
n

It is highlighted that the winning action wite is evaluated regarding the winning
minority group. Then, each human n evaluates its next time slots’ reward probability
[t+1]

[t+1]

r̃n,s , ∀s ∈ S, and updates its action probabilities P rn,s , ∀s ∈ S (Eq. 2.2a, 2.2b).
Regarding the SmartPoI algorithm’s complexity, at each time slot t of the stochastic learning automata, the minority games at all PoIs are played in parallel. Moreover, since the complexity of each minority game is O(|N |s ), by denoting as Ite
the number of iterations that are needed for the convergence of the minority game
that finishes last, the overall complexity of all the minority games is O(Ite · |N |).
Furthermore, since the evaluation of the reward probability and the update of the
action probabilities of each human n for each PoI s, is performed in a constant time,
the complexity of the rest part of the SmartPoI algorithm is O(|N | · |S|). Finally,
by denoting as T the numbers of time slots that are needed for the convergence of
the stochastic learning automata, the overal complexity of the SmartPoI algorithm
is O(T · (Ite · |N | + |N | · |S|)).
A graphical representation of the overall proposed framework in this research
work is presented in Figure 2.4, summarizing the flow of information, as well as of
the control actions to conclude to the autonomous decision making process.
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Initialization

For each Timeslot
Clustering

Each human selects which
PoI to visit based on
his/her selection
probabilities.

Next Timeslot

Clusters

Minority
Game

Decide for each Cluster
the “GO” and “NOT GO”
Groups

Minority
&
Majority
Groups

Reinforcement
Learning
Updated
Selection
Probabilities

Each human updates
his/her PoI’s probabilities
of selection based on the
new reward probabilities
values

End of Timeslots

Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of the overall proposed framework in this research work summarizing the flow of information, as well as of the control actions to
conclude to the autonomous decision making process.
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Algorithm 1 SmartPoI Algorithm
1: Function {Main}:
[0]

2: Input/Initialization: N, S, in,s , dn,s , SIn,j , cs , Nsthres
[0]

1
|S| , ∀n ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S
[Pr∗1 , . . . , Pr∗n , . . . , Pr∗|N| ]

t = 0, Conv = 0, P rn,s =
3: Output: Pr∗ =

4: while Conv == 0 do
5:

Ns = ∅, ∀s ∈ S

6:

Choose an (t) ∈ S, Nan (t) = Nan (t) ∪ {n}, ∀n ∈ N
[t]

based on Prn
7:

M inorityGame(Ns , Nsthres ), ∀s ∈ S

8:

Evaluate rn,s , r̃n,s , P rn,an (t) , P rn,s

9:
10:

[t+1]

[t+1]

[t+1]

Conv = 1, if ∀n ∈ N , ∃s ∈ S:

[t+1]

via Eq. 2.1, 2.2a, 2.2b ∀n ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S

[t+1]
|P rn,s

− 1| ≤ 0.99

t=t+1

11: end while
[t]

12: Pr∗n = Prn , ∀n ∈ N
13: EndFunction
14: Function {MinorityGame}:
ite
ite
= 0.5, πn,a
= 0, ite = 0, Conv = 0, ∀n ∈
15: Input/Initialization: Ns , Nsthres , prn,a
n
n

N, ∀an ∈ An
16: Output: NsGO , NsN GO
17: while Conv == 0 do
18:

NsGO = NsN GO = ∅

19:

ite
ite
ite
Choose aite
n , ∀n ∈ Ns based on prn = [prn,0 , prn,1 ]

20:

GO = N GO ∪ {n}
if aite
n = 1, then Ns
s

else NsN GO = NsN GO ∪ {n}
21:

if |NsGO | ≤ Nsthres , then wite = 1 else wite = 0

22:

ite+1 = π ite + f ite
πn,a
n,an
an
n

23:

ite+1 = exp (γ · π ite+1 )/
prn,a
n,an
n

24:

ite+1 − 1| ≤ 0.99
Conv = 1, if ∀n ∈ Ns , ∃an ∈ An : |prn,a
n

25:

ite = ite + 1

P

∀an ∈An

ite+1 ) ∀a ∈ A , ∀n ∈ N
exp (γ · πn,a
n
n
s
n

26: end while
27: EndFunction
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Experiments

3.1

Experiment Setup

In this chapter, a detailed numerical evaluation of the proposed approach is presented
in terms of the overall framework’s operation efficiency (Section 3.2) and superiority
compared to other alternatives (Section 3.3). For our simulations, that were carried
out using MATLAB software, we considered a smart city area that consists of |N | =
100 humans randomly distributed in the smart city setting and |S| = 6 PoIs. The
interest in,s as well as the social interest of interaction among the humans SIn,j are
randomly and uniformly assigned to the humans, while Nthres = [6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16]
and c = [0.166, 0.333, 0.5, 0.666, 0.833, .999]. A detailed Monte Carlo analysis has
been executed for all the presented numerical results considering averages over 10, 000
executions.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Average convergence time and average humans’ reward vs b and (b)
Action probabilities convergence

3.2

SmartPoI Framework’s Operation

First, we evaluate the operation of the socio-physical PoI selection following the
proposed reinforcement learning technique. Figure 3.1a presents the impact of the
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learning rate parameter b on the average convergence time of the PoI selection and
the corresponding average reward (Eq. 2.1). The results reveal that for small values
of the learning rate parameter, the humans exploit more thoroughly the available
PoIs, thus, they make a better choice of PoI, resulting in increased average reward.
However, the latter comes with the cost of increased convergence time to a PoI’s
selection. In the rest of our analysis, we consider b = 0.4. Additionally, in Figure
3.1b, the action probabilities convergence is presented for one representative human
in the smart city. The results illustrate that the execution time of the proposed
PoI selection mechanism is less than 1 sec, which makes it practical for real-life
applications.
In Figures 3.2a-3.2d, we present a detailed analysis of the internal operation of
the PoI selection reinforcement learning mechanism based on the proposed reward
function (Eq. 2.1), which captures humans’ and PoIs’ social and physical characteristics. Figure 3.2 illustrates the average cluster size of the humans that selected
each PoI based on: (a) the varying cost cs of the PoIs, (b) the varying distance
dn,s , n ∈ N, s ∈ S, (c) the varying PoIs’ capacity Nsthres , s ∈ S, (d) all the varying
factors of the reward function in Eq. 2.1. It is noted that in Figures 3.2(a)-3.2(c) only
one parameter is varying, while the rest of the factors are the same for all the users
for all the PoIs for fairness in the comparison. The results reveal that the humans
proportionally select the PoI with the lower cost cs (Figure 3.2a) and the higher capacity (Figure 3.2c). The results also illustrate that the humans select the PoI with
the closest physical proximity (Figure 3.2b). In Figure 3.2d a more complex case is
examined and presented, where multiple social and physical factors are varying. It
is observed that the cost cs becomes a dominant factor in humans’ PoI selection, i.e.,
more humans select PoIs 1 and 2 which have the relatively lower cost. However, the
dominance of the PoIs’ cost in the PoI selection can be limited by other factors such
as the humans’ distance from the PoIs and the PoIs capacity. For example, even if
PoI 3 has lower cost compared to PoI 6, less humans select PoI 3, as it has a smaller
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capacity than PoI 6, thus it can easily become congested and unable to efficiently
serve them.
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Figure 3.2: Humans’ cluster size per PoI for varying (a) PoIs’ cost cs (b) humans’
distance from PoIs’ dn,s , (c) PoIs’ capacity Nsthres , and (d) all the socio-physical
factors in Eq.2.1
25

Chapter 3. Experiments

Therefore, we conclude that the holistic consideration of the humans’ and PoIs’
social and physical characteristics in the PoI selection process can better capture the
realistic environment of the smart city.
Next, we discuss the operation of the minority games approach which enables the
humans who initially selected a PoI to finally determine if they will visit it. The
convergence of the humans’ action probabilities is presented in Figure 3.3a for two
indicative subjects. Also, Figure 3.3b presents the humans’ attendance to one PoI,
thres
= 8. The results reveal that the proposed
which has a corresponding capacity Ns=2

decision-making approach of the minority games is of low time complexity (i.e., order
of msec) and the number of humans who go to a PoI, stays close to PoI’s capacity,
thus the PoI serves the humans in an efficient manner.
1
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Figure 3.3: Convergence of human’s (a) action probabilities and (b) attendance.
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3.3

Comparative Results

In this subsection, we provide a comparative analysis of our approach focusing on
the benefits of: (a) the holistic consideration of the humans’ and PoIs’ socio-physical
characteristics and (b) the stochastic learning automata technique to enable the
humans to learn the most beneficial selection of a PoI.
Initially, we consider a scenario, where the PoI selection by the humans and the
decision to go to a PoI is performed following the procedure presented in the SmartPoI algorithm, while six different alternatives are examined regarding the considered
reward function (Eq. 2.1). In particular, the different cases considered are as follows,
[t+1]

1
,
cs

[t+1]

(b) distance: rn,s =

1
,
dn,s

[t+1]

[t+1]

(c) interest: rn,s = in,s , (d) SmartP
[k]
[t+1]
PoI, i.e., the reward function is given by Eq. 2.1, (e) QoS: rn,s = tk=0 QoSn,s (f)
P |Go[t]
[t+1]
[t]
s
social interest: rn,s = |N
SIn,j . For fairness in the comparison, we use the rej=1
(a) cost: rn,s =

ward function of Eq. 2.1 to capture the humans’ satisfaction (Figure 3.4a). Also the
average convergence time to the PoIs selection (Figure 3.4b) and the average cluster
size of humans per PoI (Figure 3.4c) are presented. The results reveal that the holistic consideration of the humans’ and PoIs’ characteristics, i.e., SmartPoI scenario,
conclude to improved humans’ satisfaction (Figure 3.4a), while allowing the humans
to quickly learn their desired PoI selection (Figure 3.4b) and not overcongest the
PoIs (Figure 3.4c).
Moreover, the linear relationship of the influential factor (i.e., interest case) with
the humans’ reward function concludes to a slow update rule of PoI selection and a
corresponding low achieved satisfaction compared to a convex relationship (i.e., distance case), which enables the humans to rapidly exploit the smart city environment
and make a better PoI selection. Moreover, if the PoI selection is based only on
the PoIs’ physical characteristics (e.g., cost case), the humans initially select the PoI
with the lowest cost (thus, they increase their perceived satisfaction), and when they
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exceed the PoIs’ capacity, they quickly learn that this PoI selection is not beneficial
anymore and they choose another PoI.
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per PoI, for different reward functions
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Furthermore, if the humans’ personal characteristics are considered for the PoI
selection, i.e., QoS and social interest cases, the humans have a myopic view of the
smart city environment based only on their own perspective, thus they are not able to
efficiently and quickly exploit their choices and they achieve low levels of satisfaction.
Additionally, in Figure 3.4c it is observed that based on the performed Monte Carlo
analysis, the cost, distance, and interest cases conclude to equal human distributions
per PoI, while the SmartPoI and QoS cases that consider the PoIs’ capacity during
the PoI selection process do not overcongest the PoIs. Also, in the social interest
case, we observe that the humans tend to select the PoI with the highest capacity,
as in this case they have better chances to meet other humans with similar interests.
Next, we consider another comparative scenario, where the humans select to visit
a PoI based on the following alternatives: (a) lowest cost, (b) lowest distance from
a PoI, (c) maximum interest for a PoI, and (d) randomly, instead of fully exploiting
the proposed SmartPoI framework. The results reveal that the PoI selection based
on the SmartPoI framework concludes to superior reward for the humans (Figure
3.5a), as they thoroughly exploit their available choices. The random PoI selection
gives the worst rewards to the humans, while it is observed that the humans become
more satisfied if they pay less to visit a PoI compared to the cases where they have
to travel a large distance for their visit or if they are highly interested in visiting the
PoI. Finally, following the performed Monte Carlo analysis, the results reveal that
the SmartPoI framework does not congest the PoIs, while all the other examined
comparative cases equally distribute the humans among the PoIs, thus, congesting
some PoIs with small capacity Nsthres .
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Conclusion and Future Works

In this thesis, the problem of the socio-physical human orchestration in smart city environments is studied by exploiting reinforcement learning and game-theoretic techniques. Initially, the humans act as stochastic learning automata probabilistically
selecting to visit a Point of Interest based on the reward that they receive and
their past experience. The introduced humans’ reward captures their social characteristics, as well as the PoIs’ physical characteristics. At the second layer of the
proposed approach, the humans that have selected the same PoI ”compete” with
each other towards finally visiting it. The latter humans’ behavior is studied as a
non-cooperative minority game among the humans. The Nash equilibrium point of
the game is determined, which identifies the specific humans that will finally visit
each PoI. A distributed low-complexity algorithm is presented to realize the proposed framework, while the efficiency and superiority of the proposed framework is
evaluated and demonstrated through modeling and simulation.
Part of our current and future work includes the testing of the proposed framework in the real smart city environment of the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico,
USA and based on the realistic outcomes, and observations to fine tune the theoret-
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ical model.
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